in the high court of justiciary at camp zeist
Bill of the Netherlands: AP Campbell QC, chief defense counsel, representative of defense counsel;
Agent lawyer Turnbull QC;
Lake and Armstrong
Crown agent. Alt:Taylor QC; Burns QC;
The lawyers for the first defendants were Beckett, Mike\'s Court, Edinburgh. Keen QC;
The lawyer for the second defendant, Davidson QC, McLeod, McGreg Donald. 
At 1903 hours on December 22, 1988, flight PanAm 103 fell from the air.
259 passengers and crew members on board and 11 residents of Lockerbie, whose wreckage has fallen, were killed.
The official case is that the cause of the disaster is that both defendants, whether acting alone or coordinating with each other, have introduced an explosive device into the cargo hold of the aircraft.
The device exploded while the plane was in Scottish airspace, causing the plane to disintegrate.
In this case, it was initially argued that the accused was guilty of conspiracy to murder, or of murder, or in violation of Article 2 (1)and (5)
Aviation Safety Act 1982.
At the end of the official submissions, however, defamation was limited to murder charges. 
The cause of this disaster is indeed an explosion of a device inside the aircraft, which is not controversial at all and fully proven.
There is also no dispute that the person or responsible person who intentionally introduced the explosive device will be guilty of murder.
Therefore, the question at issue in this trial is whether the Crown has proved without reasonable doubt that one or the other or both of the defendants is responsible, actor or artistic and partial, intentional introduction of equipment. 
After the disaster, the police took large-scale action to recover as much debris as possible to determine the cause of the accident.
Thousands of items have been recycled, screened and recorded, and relevant experts have checked any items that seem particularly interested to indicate the possible cause of the explosion. 
All parts of the aircraft originally recovered were taken to a hangar in Longcheng for inspection by the Inspector of the aviation accident investigation board (\"AAIB\").
Subsequently, the relevant parts of the aircraft were rebuilt as much as possible in fanborough.
It was found that most of the breaks on the body skin were overload breaks, consistent with the type of damage expected for air breaks
The structure of the aircraft.
However, it is not typical to have a fault failure feature in one region.
This area is located on the port side of the lower fuselage of the front freight bay area.
The basic structure of the aircraft consists of 20 \"separated\" substantial vertical frames and about 10 \"separated\" horizontal longitudinal beams, with the fuselage casing attached to the outside.
A small area of the structure, surrounded by about 700 and 720 frames and strings on the left and 40 left of 38, so about 20 \"squares, have been completely broken.
The cracks around the crushing area have particle properties, while further away are typical tear cracks.
There are signs of trouble and riots around the broken area.
The skin panels right around the broken area have been twisted and torn in a starburst pattern and wound outward.
Judging from the nature of this damage, it is concluded that we accept this conclusion that the cause of the damage is the explosion of the explosive device inside the fuselage, as the initial crushing area becomes the focus of subsequent petalling failure modes.
From the beginning of the process that caused the plane to completely interrupt the settlement, the further process began. 
Cargo bay in front of the port side is loaded with luggage inside the container.
These containers are about 5\' by 5\' and are tilted upwards from the bottom of the outside about 18 \", designed to maximize the use of the curved space in the hold.
Most containers are made of aluminum, except to open the rear side of the load and then cover with plastic curtains.
Several containers are made of glass.
The containers are loaded onto the aircraft through the doors in the cargo hold, and then slide on the rollers to the intended position, where they are clamped.
As part of the reconstruction process, the recycled containers were reassembled, mainly by Mr Clayton, AAIB\'s engineering inspector.
When doing so, it is determined that, with the exception of two exceptions, the container was not damaged except for the collapse of the aircraft and the fall of the container to the ground.
However, abnormal damage was found in aluminum container AVE 4041 and fiber container AVN 7511.
According to the loading plan of the container, it is determined that AVE 4041 is located on the inside and above of the fuselage crushing area, and AVN 7511 is located on the front and rear of AVE 4041.
The reconstruction of AVE 4041 shows that the floor panels and the outer Foundation frame members of the outer rear quadrant are severely damaged, and in addition, there are some areas of blackening and pitting in the interior of this part of the container.
The panels and frame members in the lower part of the rear part of the stand-out are also damaged, and the blackening and pitting appear again.
The full details of the nature and extent of the damage will be found in Mr. Clayton\'s evidence and confirmed in the evidence of Dr. Hayes and Mr. ferradi, forensic scientists at the Royal Institute for arms research and development (\"RARDE\").
The nature of the damage indicates that,
The energy events, as well as the sooting and pitting indicate the explosion.
Mr Clayton gave evidence in an impressive manner of prudence and restraint, saying: \"I have no doubt that such an incident occurred from within the container \", the only time he made an absolutely unqualified opinion.
Since the regional distribution of sooting and pitting, in particular, there is no such sign at the bottom of the container, Mr. Clayton submits that, assuming that an explosive device is contained in one of the luggage in the container, it may be that the luggage is not lying on the floor of the container, but may lie on the box on the floor, protruding to the prominent part of the container.
Taking into account the damage of the adjacent container AVN 7511, it is helpful to determine the precise location of the explosive device.
There is a hole in the front of that container, about 8 \"square 10\" up from the top of the bottom, radiating outward from this hole, which is the sooting area extending to the top of the container.
This suggests that a relatively mild explosion has left AVE 4041 and struck at a certain angle on the front face of AVN 7511.
Combining this information with damage to AVE 4041, the possible location of the explosive device is about 13 above the AVE 4041 floor.
According to this assumption, combined with the previous assumption that the baggage containing the device is projected into the suspension, the position of the device is about 25 \"from the skin of the fuselage.
So far, we have found Mr. Clayton\'s evidence to be completely credible, reliable and convincing.
However, he is not an expert in the effects of explosives or explosives.
Dr. Hayes and Mr. Feraday\'s conclusion on the location of the explosive device coincides with Mr. Clayton\'s conclusion, and in addition, Mr. Feraday was present for testing in the United States.
These tests include the use of metal containers filled with luggage and the placement of plastic explosives into suitcases filled with clothes.
The test confirmed his view on the location of the explosive device and the number of explosives involved. 
Dr. Cullis and Professor Peel provided technical evidence relating to the effects of explosives.
Dr. Cullis is an expert in the study of the effects of explosions and the development of computer codes to simulate the effects of explosions in specific different situations and is employed by defense assessment and research institutions (\"DERA\")since 1978.
Professor Peel, the chief scientist of DERA, specializes in the materials and structures used in aircraft and leads a research team to study, among other things, the effects of explosive explosions in aircraft.
They confirm that the presence of hemp points and carbon deposits that look like very fine soot suggests a chemical explosion.
The area in which this occurs must be consistent with the explosives, especially in the case of the point, there must be no intermediate structure of sufficient mass to prevent the blast debris impact pit area.
The nature of the cracking of the container bottom plate is a typical deformation that can be seen from the explosion load, however, there is no pitting or sooting in the area, indicating that there must be something else between the explosive device and the floor, like another suitcase.
On the other hand, the hemp point and sooting seen on the inside of the container horizontal Foundation frame member, coupled with the downward deformation of the member, confirm that the view of the explosive device located above is in the direct line of sight of the member, so it is possible that at least part is located in the prominent part where there is a suitcase on the container floor that will not prevent the explosive product from hitting that member.
Further confirmation of the location of the explosive device comes from the observation of the upper surface crushing of the aircraft fuselage frame 700, as well as the hemp point and sooting of the two adjacent frames, an area near the rear and lower part of the container end.
Professor Peel\'s evidence also includes a rather complex part of the nature of the Pulse load, namely, the critical pulse level for failure of aluminum alloy plates used in the fuselage shell, and the calculation of the two brackets
Distance from the crushing zone and petalled zone and the size of the amount of explosives.
These calculations show that the cost of about 450 grams and
The distance is 610, which will cause the explosion to take place within the container at 200.
We do not think it is necessary to discuss these complex calculations in detail, as physical evidence of damage to the hull, container, as we will see later, without doubt, what is inside the container convinced us that the explosion occurred inside the container, and the calculation was only to confirm this view.
We should add that this part of his evidence also deals with the impact of the concept of Mach-Rod formation, if any, but we do not think it is necessary to have any detailed discussion about this, because we accept his evidence that, although the concept is considered a means of assessing the position --
It is not actually used in the distance. 
In addition to the evidence of these experts, they are all aware that the damage to the aircraft was caused by an explosion, as well as Dr. Douse\'s evidence that who has been working for years on trace analysis of drugs and explosives, cooperation with RARDE in 1988.
He pioneered the application of capillary gas chromatography, a method currently recognized.
He checked whether two pieces of metal had explosive residues (labels 270. 1 and 270. 3)
This is identified as two main parts of the outer base member of the container AVE 4041.
The procedure involved is described in detail in Dr. Douse\'s evidence, and finally some traces are left, where peaks at specific points may indicate the presence of different types of explosives.
These changes include different toluene, nitric acid, PETN, and blacksotoday.
There may also be other peaks that are notexplosive co-extractives.
Traces associated with 270. 1 and 270.
3 shows the existence of PETN and heisuo today.
These chemicals are used in the manufacture of plastic explosives, including Semtex. In cross-
Upon review, it was suggested to him that Professor Caddy submitted a report to Parliament on 1996 stating that the centrifuge used by RARDE may have been contaminated, rendering his conclusion invalid.
However, while the report does indicate that the centrifuge was contaminated with blacksorkin, it also makes it clear that certain inspections carried out during the period, including December 1988, were not affected, in the list of those inspections, including Dr. Douse\'s examination of Lockerbie debris.
It was further suggested to him that the traces revealed peaks consistent with the presence of TNT, DNT and nitric acid, but, for the detailed reasons he gave in the evidence, he was fully satisfied that, the peaks have nothing to do with these forms of explosions, but with non-explosions. explosive co-extractives.
We see no reason to doubt the conclusion reached by this experienced expert.
Finally, it is considered that the laboratory has taken inadequate precautions and used control swabs of clothing and equipment to prevent the risk of distortion of results due to contamination.
However, both Dr. Douse and Dr. Hayes describe the precautions taken to prevent pollution, and we are satisfied that, these precautions are sufficient to prevent any risk that Dr. Douse\'s test is invalid due to any contamination. 
From this evidence, we are fully convinced that the cause of the disaster was the explosion of a device inside the aircraft.
We would also be satisfied that the unit is in AVE 4041 containers, but the evidence associated with checking the apparent contents of the container would remove any possible suspicion of this and we are now turning to it. 
During the large-scale ground search, a large amount of luggage and clothing was collected and labeled.
Within a few days of the disaster, it was determined that an explosion had occurred, and as such, the searcher was specifically asked to take back any items that looked burnt or blackened or appeared to be involved in the explosion.
Subsequently, any such item was submitted to the forensic explosion laboratory in RARDE for a detailed examination, involving the principal forensic scientists, Dr. Hayes and Mr. Feraday. Fifty-
Six pieces showing signs of damage to various explosives were identified as part of a 26 \"silhouette 4000 series Brown hard shell Samsonite suitcase (
The nature of the damage indicates that it was caused from inside the trunk.
The 4 pieces of luggage are characterized by the fact that their explosive damage is quite close to the explosive device.
Among many of these items, fragments that appear to be part of the main suitcase were found, as well as fragments that appear to be radio cassette players.
Other similar pieces were found in the clothes, and from the appearance of their burning, the pieces were considered contained in the main trunk.
Also, when checking the data board connected to AVE 4041, Mr Clayton found a piece of debris that appeared to be a small board.
The number of pieces related to the clothing in close contact with the explosion and the extent of the fragmentation of these pieces indicate that the explosive charge is likely to be located in the radio.
To the knowledge of the time, on October 1988, West German police recovered a Toshiba radio cassette player that was converted into an improvised explosive device.
Mr. Feraday visited West Germany, checked the device and determined that the pieces he had, in particular the board pieces recovered by Mr. Clayton, were not from the same model.
However, he believes there is enough similarity and it is worth studying other models of Toshiba player.
Seven Models of printed circuit boards were found to have exactly the same properties as the chips.
Subsequently, when examining the clothes damaged by the explosion in detail, it was found that there were two different Slalom brand shirts, one was Babygro and the other was plaid trousers, proof of inspection is the piece of paper in the owner\'s manual of Toshiba RT-
SF 16 broadcast cassette player.
All other pieces of radio believed to have originated from explosives and from RT-SF 16.
Other pieces of plastic related to the radio were found in other clothing considered in the main suitcase, namely, white T-
Shirts, cream pajamas, herringbone jackets and brown herringbone trousers, as well as four items to discover pieces of paper.
The conclusion reached by forensic scientists is that the nature of these fragments and their distribution undoubtedly indicate that the explosive charge is contained in the Toshiba radio and we agree with that conclusion.
Considering the existence of fragments of RT-
We also acknowledge that the Toshiba radio model is involved. 
As we have pointed out, a large number of garments have been checked in RARDE.
The main problem is to determine which clothes are showing signs of explosive damage and, if possible, to distinguish between clothes that may be included in a suitcase equipped with explosive devices and clothes in adjacent suitcases.
Forensic scientists have adopted the method of treating any clothes damaged by an explosion as high probability of containing radio cassette players, instructions and pieces of brown fabric --
Lining cardboard partitions from inside the trunk to outside of the shell fragments are all inside the main trunk.
If the dress is neither carrying debris from the explosive device nor carrying the case of one or more suitcases surrounding it, or, when it carries pieces of the suitcase shell with or without pieces of explosive devices, its specific location is problematic, although the possibility that it is included in the main suitcase cannot be discounted.
There were 12 pieces of clothing and an umbrella in which the pieces were recovered and inspected, which belonged to the first category, so they believed that the pieces were contained in the main suitcase.
These items are :-2)
The explosion damaged the debris of the brown plaid pattern material, two of which still retain part of the label, which is considered part of the 34 Yorkie brand pants.
In one of the pieces, fragments of the main suitcase lining and internal partition were found, five pieces of black plastic that may have come from Toshiba radio, four pieces of RT-
SF 16 owner\'s manual, as well as five regiments consistent with the five regiments of blue/white fibers from baby growth. 3)
In terms of color, tissue, and texture, four pieces of burnt and broken gray cloth appear to have a common origin.
One of the pieces is sewn on it with the \"Slalom\" tag on it, and all pieces are consistent with the pieces from the gray Slalom brand shirt.
Included in one of the clips (
PI/995 with police tag)
Many items were found.
We will return to this segment later, as the defense argues that there are many factors surrounding its discovery and review that affect the reliability of the evidence associated with it. 4)
Six burnt pieces of white material with fine blue pinsstripe.
Although there are no identification marks on these pieces, their color, weaving, texture and structure indicate that their source is a shirt that is very similar to the Slalom brand shirt.
Among these pieces, 16 pieces of black plastic and 4 pieces of speaker grid were found, which may come from pieces of Toshiba radio and RT-
SF 16 owner manual. 5)Four explosion-
Broken pieces of light brown herringbone woven cloth.
Although there are no identifying marks on these shards, their color, organization, texture, and structure indicate that their source is a Yorkie brand pants.
Six pieces of black plastic and a partition of the main suitcase were found inside. 6)Three explosions.
Broken pieces of herringbone brown tweed cloth.
Although there are no identification marks on these fragments, their color, way of weaving, texture, and structure indicate that their source is a tweed jacket, similar in all respects to the control samples obtained by the police.
These pieces are pieces of black plastic and luggage partitions. 7)
Four pieces of cream-colored material with a brown stripe pattern.
One of them is a very important item that can be clearly identified as the wreckage of the pajamas.
Although there are no identification marks on these shards, their colors, patterns and structures indicate that they are sourced from a pair of Panwear branded pajamas.
They have pieces of black plastic and lining in their suitcases. 8)
Thirteen very badly damaged pieces of blue fiber material, many very small.
One piece consists of two covering materials, one is a blue fiber material and the other is a knitted white ribbed material.
Between the two pieces, there is a piece of labeled wreckage trapped in printing in different colors, which contains information about age, height, composition and \"made in Malta.
This composite Shard closely matches the marked neck of the babypriprimark brand in all important respects.
The material of other pieces also matches the material of the same brand.
Glued to these various pieces are pieces of black plastic on Toshiba\'s owner\'s manual, pieces of wire, pieces of paper, and pieces of the partition of the main trunk. 9)
Three pieces of black nylon umbrella.
The main debris consists of a portion of the canopy, cracks and dried handles, chopped and partially collapsed, indicating a close correlation with the explosion.
Strongly attached to the Crown material are blue and white fibers that look similar to Babygro fibers.
The second fragment is a piece of silver coated black plastic with grooves on the surface, similar to a part of the umbrella lock ring, which was found in the fragments of the plaid trousers (item 2 above). 10)
Debris from the explosion damaged the brown knitted wool cardigan.
The item is sewn with a label printed with \"design of Puccini.
The remaining three items are clearly closely related to the explosion, but there is not enough material to determine their source. 
The nature and extent of the damage to the garment and the items embedded in it confirm that if confirmation is required, the explosion occurred in AVE 4041 containers and, without doubt, that the explosive device was contained in Toshiba RT-
The SF 16 radio cassette player in the brown Samsonite suitcase also contains the clothing listed above. 
It will be remembered that four items identified as being in the main trunk are labeled as from the Yorkie, Slalom, Primark and Puccini brands.
On August 1989, the police visited Malta to try to trace the source of the items.
On September 1, they visited York clothing and went to Mary\'s house on Sliema Tower Road.
This is a store run by the Gauci family, and Tony Gauci is one of the partners.
Mr Gauci\'s evidence was that he had been visited by the police in September 1989.
He was able to tell them that he recalled a special sale about two weeks before Christmas 1988, although he could not remember the exact date.
He remembered that the lights had just been hung up for Christmas.
It\'s mid-week, maybe Wednesday.
Time is about 6. 30pm.
The buyer was a man and the witness recognized him as a Libyan.
The conversation with the buyer may be a mix of Arabic, English and Maltese.
Many Libyans visit his shops and when he hears them speak, he can tell the difference between the Libyan and the Tunisian or the Egyptian.
He bought all kinds of clothes, but in the witness\'s view, the nature of what he bought did not matter.
Among the items that the witness remembers to sell, there are two Yorkie pants, two striped pajamas of the same brand as the Panwear shard, a tweed jacket, and a blue baby dress. this casual shirt has two pieces, A Brown, a blue, and an umbrella.
The order number seen on the Shard of one of the Yorkie pants is 1705, and the delivery note for this order shows that it was delivered on November 18, 1988.
The police obtained samples of all these items from Mr. Gauci or the manufacturer, which were samples used by forensic doctors when comparing them with fragments.
After about nine months he was able to remember this particular sale in such detail, which seemed surprising, but he explained that the purchaser seemed not interested in the item he was buying.
However, we are satisfied that his memory of these items is accurate.
While no one ever suggested to him that his recollection might have been helped by the police, he made it clear that the purchase did not include abandado T-
Although he did store the items, it would be a shirt of interest to the police.
While there is no doubt that individual goods may have been purchased in many other stores in Malta, or actually elsewhere in the world, since many of them are exported, the exact match between so many items and the pieces found in Lockerbie is not just a coincidence in our opinion.
Therefore, we are completely satisfied that the clothes in the main suitcase were purchased at Mary\'s house as described by Mr. Gauci.
We will go back in more detail to Mr Gauci\'s evidence regarding the date of sale and the identity of the buyer. 
We are now moving to another key project found in the process of finding debris.
On January 13, 1989, DC Gilchrist and DC McColm conducted line searches in an area near Newcastleton.
They found a piece of burnt material that was then labeled 995 by the police number PI/168.
The original inscription on our satisfactory label is the \"cloth\" written by DC Gilchrist (charred)\".
The word \"clothes\" has been covered by the word \"fragments.
There is no satisfactory explanation as to why this is done, and DC Gilchrist tries to explain this, which is evaded in the worst case and at best confusing.
However, we are satisfied that this item was indeed found in the area described, confirming that the DC McColm of the DC Gilchrist did not cross when the item was found
Check the details of the discovery of this project.
The item was logged into the property store at Dextar on January 17, 1989.
The defense suggests that there is some sinister meaning, either on the change of the original label or on the delay between the discovery of the item and the login to Dextar.
As we have already pointed out, there does not seem to be any special reason for the change of the label, however, we are satisfied that it has no sinister reason and has not been tampered with by the discoverer.
In terms of post-logging, during that period there was a large amount of debris being recovered, and the logs showed that many other items were logged in only a few days after receipt.
Therefore, we do not see sinister connotations at this point.
Because it was a piece of burnt material, it was sent for a forensic examination.
According to his notes, Dr. Hayes initially checked the project in May 12, 1989.
His notes show that it was found to be part of the neckline of the gray shirt, and when the control sample was obtained, it looked similar in all respects to the neckline of the revolving shirt.
Local penetration holes and blackening are consistent with the participation of explosives and are severely damaged by explosions.
Nine pieces of black plastic, a small piece of metal, a small piece of wire and multiple pieces of metal are embedded in some penetration holes
Layered pieces of white paper (
It was subsequently determined to be a fragment of Toshiba RT -.
SF 16 and its manual).
Fragments of a green circuit board were also found embedded.
The next reference to the last clip took place in a memo sent by Mr. Feraday to CI Williamson on September 15, 1989, which attached its Polaroid photo and asked for help in trying to identify it.
For three reasons, the defense again tried to question the source of this piece of the circuit board.
First, Dr. Hayes\'s inspection record is numbered 51 pages.
The subsequent pages were originally numbered between 51 and 55, but the numbers were overwritten between 52 and 56.
It was suggested to Dr. Hayes that the original 51 to 55 pages had been renumbered and the original 56 pages had been deleted, thus making room for the insertion of the new 51 pages.
Dr. Hayes explained that his notes were not initially paginated at all.
When he prepares the report based on his original notes, he more or less arranges the notes in chronological order and adds page numbers at the top.
He assumed that he had no intention of numbering two consecutive pages to 51, and after numbering several other pages, he noticed his error and was covered by the correct number.
Pagination is not substantial as each item being checked incorporates the check date into the notes.
The second reason for suspicion is said to be that in most cases, a piece of circuit board-like debris was found in a piece of clothing, and Dr hayes\'s approach was to draw that piece, and give it a separate reference number.
This fragment is not drawn on page 51, and the name of the fragment is PT/35 (b)
It was not completed until the later date.
Finally, if the fragment was discovered in May 1989, presumably taken at that time, it would not be explained, and his colleague, Mr. Feraday, should have sent a memo in September 1989, attach a photo of Polaroid as \"the best thing I can do in such a short time \".
Dr. Hayes was unable to explain this and suggested that the person asking about the matter was Mr. Feraday, author of the memorandum, but that was not done.
While Unfortunately this particular project that is of great significance to this survey, although it is small in size, may not initially be treated in the same detail as most other projects, however, we are satisfied that Dr. Hayes, in May l989, extracted the fragment from the remainder of the Slalom shirt found by DC Gilchrist and DC McColm. 
In the following months, CI Williamson and other police officers in the printed circuit board industry conducted extensive investigations in an attempt to trace the source of the debris, but these investigations did not result.
Around June 1990, CI Williamson received information from an FBI officer named Thurman who and Mr. Feraday visited the FBI headquarters in Washington.
They showed a timing device called the MST there. 13 (label 420).
After review, it was found that there is an area on the printed circuit board inside the timer that is the same as the recovered debris, but the Washington equipment has a double
And the fragment PT/35 (b)
Only welded masked on one side.
The subsequent investigation resulted in a commission of inquiry, which enabled the Swiss judicial and police authorities to conduct an investigation on behalf of the Scottish police.
On November 1990 and January 1991, a judicial interview was conducted with partners Edwin Bolier and Owen Meister of MEBO, a company engaged in the design and manufacture of various electronic products.
A further interview with the Scottish police was conducted on May 1991.
During these interviews, a number of projects were handed over, including a large number of documents, three timers (two MST-
13 s and Olympus)
, Various components of the timer, including the circuit board.
Dr Hayes and Mr Feraday\'s detailed inspection of these items, and the comparison with the green board shards, which, without a doubt, derive from the relay of a single welded circuit board in one area of the output connection pad-
Mask type MST-13 timer.
We accept the conclusions of forensic scientists. 
So far, the evidence that we have considered has convinced us without any doubt that the cause of the disaster is the explosion of improvised explosive devices, the device, along with a variety of clothes, was put in a Toshiba radio cassette player in a brown Samsonite suitcase, which was purchased in the House of Sliema Mary, Malta, the start of the explosion is by using the MST-13 timer. 
We are now turning to the evidence relating to the source of the main trunk and the possible way it may enter AVE 4041.
This includes the procedure to consider the various airports it may pass. 
The official case is that the main suitcase was carried by Malta Airlines flight KM180 from Malta Luqa airport to Frankfurt, and in Frankfurt it was transferred to PanAm flight PA103A, A side-line plane to PA103 transported it to London Heathrow Airport, where it was then transferred to pa103.
This case depends to a large extent on oral and written evidence relating to the three airports.
It is alleged that, based on this evidence, it can be inferred that KM180 carried an unidentified and unaccompanied baggage and was transferred to PA103A in Frankfurt and to PA103 at Heathrow Airport. 
When the intended passenger checks in the cargo compartment of the aircraft, a numbered label is attached to each item.
Part of the label was removed and handed over to the passenger as a receipt.
The part attached to the baggage item usually carries the name and destination of the airline or the first airline that the passenger will travel.
If the journey will be completed on more than one leg or stage, the label also carries the name of any intermediate airport.
The purpose of the label is to enable the baggage handler at the departure airport to transport or transfer the item to the correct flight at any intermediate airport and destination and return the item to the passenger at the final destination.
In 1988, when the journey is completed in one phase, sometimes a label with the name of the destination airport is used in advance.
If there is more than one stage, the name of the destination and any intermediate airport is usually written manually on the label at the time of inspectionin.
The baggage checked in at the departure airport is called the local originating baggage.
Baggage that must be handled at the intermediate airport is often referred to as transit baggage.
The two groups of transit baggage are usually distinguished.
Online baggage refers to baggage on the same carrier\'s plane to and from the intermediate airport: International line baggage arrives on one carrier\'s plane and leaves with another carrier.
Terms are not always used consistently, however.
The baggage is intended to be on the same plane as the passenger to which it belongs, but the baggage is sometimes misled or delayed and must be on a different flight.
These items are identified by an additional special label (called an emergency label), usually sent only in response to a request from the destination airport, after the passenger has made a claim for baggage not delivered at the destination.
The evidence at this point relates only to the practice at Luqa Airport, but seems to reflect international practice.
The passenger plane can also carry mail and other goods. 
In 1988 and some time before, airline operators and airport authorities are generally aware that explosive devices may be attempted to be placed on passenger planes, and systems designed to minimize this risk have been installed.
In particular, it is normal to take measures to prevent passengers with checked baggage from traveling on an unaccompanied aircraft unless there is sufficient reason to believe that these items are safe.
It is normal to ask certain questions to passengers who have checked their luggage for the flight, and to ensure that every passenger who has checked their luggage at the departure airport has boarded the plane, or, before allowing a safe departure, security is guaranteed.
Similarly, measures have been taken to check that transit baggage is not traveling without accompanying passengers.
These steps vary between different airports and different airlines.
By 1988, PanAm has run an x-
International line luggage at Frankfurt and Heathrow Airport.
The availability of the facility has resulted in changes in the way passengers and luggage are handled in intermodal transport. 
PA103 from Heathrow airport take off December 21, 1988 1830 day before.
This is the last trans-Atlantic PanAm flight of the day.
Therefore, Heathrow Airport is the last place to introduce explosive devices into the cargo compartment of the aircraft.
The plane stopped in stand k14 before taking off.
It has been checked before and has completed the airworthiness certificate for it.
PA103A arrived at K16 station and passengers traveling to New York were instructed to go directly to gate 14.
Boarding of passengers, including passengers from Heathrow and passengers connecting from PA103A, was carried out normally except for a passenger who checked two pieces of luggage at Heathrow Airport who did not show up at the gate
The passenger was an American citizen, although he did notappearance.
He was later found drinking at a bar at the airport and missed the boarding call.
There is no reason to link the passenger or his consignment with the explosive device. 
At Heathrow Airport, like in Frankfurt, PanAm luggage is handled by PanAm\'s staff.
The Security duties of PanAm are carried out by the employees of the subsidiary company Alert Security of PanAm.
Checked baggage at Heathrow Airport was delivered to a place called Luggage Building --
When the plane is ready to load, it is taken to the area before it is on board. The build-
The Up area is adjacent to the widely used roads in the airport.
In December 1988, the airport was busier than usual due to construction work being carried out.
If, like a Boeing 747 aircraft, luggage or any luggage is loaded into a container and put into the aircraft, this is done during construction --up area.
Connecting luggage arriving at Heathrow Airport was unloaded by airport staff and delivered to a place called connecting shed.
This cabin is an independent building in the airport terminal.
The baggage removed from the inbound flight was taken outside the shed by an employee of a company called Whyte\'s, which was employed by the Airport Authority and placed on a conveyor belt, bringing it into the cabin
There are no security guards outside the shed, so placing items on the conveyor belt is unsupervised.
Interline shed handles luggage for other airlines and also for PanAm.
In the shed, the combined baggage of the PanAm flight is identified and separated from the baggage of other airlines.
It was taken to PanAm x-
X-ray machine, where X-ray machine checks
Ray, Alert\'s employee. After x-
Ray, it is put in a container or put aside to wait for the flight that is about to take off. 
X-December 21, 1988-
Ray operator is Sulkash Kamboj.
Loader worker John Bedford
The driver employed by PanAm and Mr. Parmar, another PanAm employee, are working in the middle shed.
Mr. Bedford reserved container Avenue 4041 to receive combined baggage for pa93.
Mr. Bedford identified the container as a container of PA103, and he wrote the information on a piece of paper and placed it on a bracket fixed on the container.
There are many items in that container.
Later Mr Bedford drove the container to a location near the baggage depot.
Leave it there.
From there, the container was taken to stand K16 and the New York luggage removed from PA103A was loaded inside.
The plane entering the port put the luggage in the cabin, not in the container.
Evidence from Mr. Bedford and Mr. Peter Walker, head of baggage construction --
And the construction of the main loader Dashan Sandhu and the container-up sheet (1217)
, Showing that the container AVE 4041 contains the middle line luggage already placed in the middle line shed and the baggage removed from PA103A.
When it is full, the container AVE 4041 is driven directly to the stand 14 and loaded onto the stand.
Evidence of another driver, Terence Crabtree
The loader employed by PanAm, who is the crew commander for PA103 loading, and the loading plan (1183)
, Showing that the container is loaded on the left side of position 14, corresponding to the location determined by forensic evidence.
The plan also showed that the container AVN 7511 was loaded in 21 adjacent locations on the left side, which again corresponds to forensic evidence.
There is also some PA103A luggage that is loosely loaded into the cargo hold of PA103A. 
Mr. Bedford said he recalled that on December 21, 1988 he had reserved container 4041 for pa93 as luggage.
He also recalled that he had many suitcases in the container.
These boxes are continuously placed on their spine along the back of the container.
He said that he had left the cottage in the middle and had tea with Mr Walker in the building --up area.
When he came back, he saw two boxes added to the container.
The boxes are placed on their sides and the handle is oriented towards the inside of the container, as he usually loads them.
The arrangement of these cases is shown in a group of photos (1114)
Filmed in the presence of Mr. Bedford in early January 1989.
Mr. Bedford said that Mr. Kamboj had told him that he had put the other two suitcases in the container while he was away.
Mr. Kamboj denied that he had put any suitcases in the container and that he had told Mr. Bedford that he had done so.
Both witnesses were referred to some of the police statements they provided at different times, as well as their evidence in their investigation into the fatal accident of the disaster, it seems that each witness has the same description throughout the process.
Mr. Kamboj finally admitted the evidence in half the time.
Mr Bedford may be right, but the contradiction is not resolved.
Mr Bedford is a clear and impressive witness and there is no reason for him to invent what he said.
Mr. Kamboj, a less impressive witness, may be anxious to avoid any possible liability.
We believe that Mr Bedford\'s evidence should be desirable at this point.
However, the distinction between witnesses does not lie in the material, because in the case it is important that there is evidence that when the container leaves the middle line area, it contains two suitcases placed as described above.
Mr. Bedford agreed that in the statement to the police officer, and in the evidence in the fatal accident investigation, he described one of the two cases of the parties as Brown or maroony-
Beautiful Brown hard shelltype case.
He did not recall what he said when he testified in this case, but said that he was telling the truth in his statement and in earlier evidence.
Mr Bedford also said that he had arranged with Mr Walker because the upcoming PA103A flight was a bit delayed, waiting for it to take him beyond the normal end time, and that he should take the container to the luggage room
Leave it there and he did it before he got off work. 00pm.
Mr. Walker did not remember what had happened, but he admitted that shortly after the incident he had told the investigating police that he remembered meeting Mr. Bedford at about 5.
At zero o\'clock P. M. Mr Bedford said he was going home, but there was no conversation about leaving a container in the building --up area.
Mr Walker\'s evidence at FAI showed whether he knew there was a container that was taken to the building --
The Up area is different from his original police statement and he is unable to explain the difference.
However, there is no reason to doubt Mr Bedford\'s evidence that he did bring AVE 4041 into the building --
Leave it there. 
Therefore, it can be seen from the evidence that when a suitcase that meets the principal suitcase\'s forensic description leaves the middle line shed, it is in the container.
There is also the possibility that by placing a conveyor belt outside the middle line shed, an unrelated suitcase can be introduced, or in the shed itself or in the container at the time of construction-up area.
In order to do this, the person who placed the suitcase must avoid being found, but the evidence suggests that it is unlikely that the person who owns the airport area pass will be questioned, and that the number of passes at Heathrow airport is very large, A large part of it is not stated.
The person who placed the suitcase also needs to know where it should be in order to achieve the goal. 
On behalf of the defendant, it was argued that the suitcase described by Mr. Bedford was likely to be the main suitcase, especially since the evidence did not disclose any hard-Beautiful shell-
In addition to the trunk of the main suitcase itself, the type suitcase has been retrieved.
As far as this argument is concerned, the effect of acceptance of forensic evidence is that it is not possible for the suitcase to come into contact directly with the floor of the container.
It is submitted that there is evidence that debris from a US tourist suitcase departing from Frankfurt has been recovered and I am closely related to the bombing and may be placed under the suitcase Mr. Bedford spoke.
This will require a re-arrangement of the items in the container, but when the baggage from Frankfurt is placed in the container on the tarmac at Heathrow Airport, this re-arrangement can easily occur.
It is true that this rearrangement may have occurred, but if there is such a rearrangement, the suitcase described by Mr Bedford may have been placed in a more remote corner of the container, although forensic evidence deals with all items found damaged by direct explosions, 20-
A total of five pieces, many other luggage were found but not dealt with in detail in the evidence in this case. 
At Frankfurt airport, most airline baggage is handled by the airport authority, but PanAm has its own security and baggage handlers.
There is a computer-controlled automatic baggage handling system in Frankfurt, through which the baggage passes.
When the baggage is brought into the system, each piece of baggage is placed in a separate numbered tray.
The tray is placed on the conveyor belt and the instructions are entered into the computer to identify the flight where the luggage is sent, the location where the plane leaves and the time of flight.
The tray is sent to the waiting area, where it is distributed until instructions are received to pick up the baggage for a particular flight, and then, automatically pick up the item from the waiting area and send it to the starting point.
Received local luggage during inspectionin desks.
No detailed evidence on how to check
The staff handled the matter, but such luggage was transferred to the system.
Transit baggage was taken to one of the two areas, identified as V3 and HM, respectively, and sent into the system where it is called a coding station.
All luggage at the airport has passed the automated system, with the exception of transit luggage, the interval between flights is less than 45 minutes.
In this case, baggage may be taken from one aircraft to another without going through the system. 
There are 7 coding stations in V3.
The photo of version 1053 shows a station like this.
The usual practice is that the baggage of an inbound flight is either taken to HM or to V3 in a van or container.
Upon arrival, the baggage on the flight will be directed to one or more coding stations by an employee named interline writer.
The right thing to do is that each coding station should not respond to baggage from multiple inbound flights at a time.
Usually there are two employees at each coding station.
People will take out their luggage from the carriage or container and put each item in the tray.
The other will enter the computer in coding form, enter the flight number and destination of the outbound flight, and get the information from the label attached to the item.
There is evidence that there may be an out-of-office employee at the coding station from time to time who will help unload the luggage and put it in the tray, the details on the label may be read out to the encoder by someone put into the tray.
The Rush tag project is handled the same way as other projects.
Items without clear labels are sent to the coding station and processed there.
Record the staff working at a particular station, the arrival time of the aircraft, the arrival time of HM or V3 luggage, and the station or station where the baggage of a particular flight is delivered.
The computer itself retains records of items sent through the system in order to identify all baggage sent through the system to a specific flight for a limited period of time.
However, after a while, this information will be lost from the system.
The baggage control system contains its own clock, and the time recorded by the clock has a tendency to deviate from real time.
Therefore, by referring to the master computer clock or the employee watch, the baggage control clock is reset at the beginning of each day.
The difference is gradual, 4. 00pm or 5.
At zero o\'clock P. M. , there may be two or three minutes.
The time entered in other records was obtained by the staff from the airport clock or their own watch. PanAm had x-
Ray equipment in Frankfurt for x-
Luggage Room line.
The system is that, according to the flight plan, the baggage arriving at the boarding gate of the PanAm flight will be divided into several categories.
As far as PA103A is concerned, this means that the loader separates London luggage, New York luggage and intermodal luggage.
The last category will be taken to x-
Ray equipment and check and return the loading.
PanAm\'s approach in Frankfurt is to reconcile local originating passengers and luggage as well as online passengers and luggage to ensure that every such passenger with luggage on the flight is counted, however, no attempt was made to coordinate the intermodal passengers and their luggage.
Reconciliation of cross-line passengers can be difficult because the staff at the gate will not know cross-line passengers until they appear at the gate to check in and receive the boarding card there.
There is evidence of two witnesses, Roland O\'Neill, the loading master of PA103A, and Monica Digler on the check
In the overseer, reconciliation was made for the combined passenger and baggage, but there was overwhelming evidence to the contrary that their evidence at this point was unacceptable.
There is no evidence of settlement from PanAm\'s director in Frankfurt, Herbert Leni, and Wolff kromes, the job location manager of PanAm.
In addition, on March 1988, Alan Berwick, head of security for the wider region, including the Middle East, sent a memorandum after discussing with Martin Hebner, security officer of the Palestinian Authority in Frankfurt (1170)
To Mr. Sonesen, The New York company officer he reported to him, asked the company-
Thunder facilities, there should be any settlement. The reply (1171)
Strong instructions if the luggage is x-
The plane should leave and should not be reconciled even if the passengers on the international line to which it belongs do not board.
In early 1989, O\'Neal issued a statement to two FAA investigators suggesting that there is usually no settlement. 
The evidence of Joachim Koscha, who was an administrator of the baggage system at Frankfurt airport on 1988, was filmed and produced 1068, showing the flight KM180 reaching its parking location on December 21, 1988, 1248.
Because it was not a PanAm flight, the staff of the airport authority uninstalled it.
It was unloaded between 1248 and 1300, according to the record.
Andreas Schreiner is responsible for monitoring the arrival of luggage at V3 on December 21, 1988.
He made the following record on a file called interline writer\'s sheet (1092):-
This means recording a car of luggage from KM180 with a location of 1248 and a speed of 1301 to reach V3.
Mr Schreiner\'s evidence is that the coding usually starts three to five minutes after the baggage arrives at v3.
Mr. Schreiner also said that luggage was always delivered only from one flight.
Mr. Schreiner and Mr. Koscha further identified production 1061 as a worksheet completed by the encoder for recording the baggage he processed.
The name of the encoder in question was Koca, and he was not summoned to testify.
The relevant parts of production 1061 are as follows :-
This record proves that a luggage van from KM180 is coded between 206 and 1304 at station 1310 of V3.
It was suggested that the number to complete the coding could be 1316, but Mr Schreiner preferred reading 1310, which is more consistent with what was seen on the document.
And documentary evidence (1062)
Aircraft for PA103A from Vienna (PA124 flights)
Was placed in position 44, from where it left London at a speed of 1653. 
Mrs. bogomilla Erak, a computer programmer employed at the airport, was on duty on December 21, 1988.
That night she heard that PA103 was lost and realized that PA103A had left during her shift.
She was interested in the amount of luggage on flight Frankfurt, and the next morning she decided to print out the information about the luggage on the computer in case it contained any useful information.
Instead of immediately confirming any such information, she retained the printed output that was later handed over to the investigators.
The print output is 1060 of production, including the following entries :-
The document itself does not contain column headings, the column headings listed above are derived from the evidence showing how to interpret the print output, referring to the code that was running at the time.
Therefore, the document must record that the item encoded at station 206 1307 was transferred and delivered to the appropriate gate for loading on the PA103A ship. 
Therefore, the whole documentary evidence clearly infers that an item that came up at KM180 was transferred to PA103A and left on PA103A.
Evidence in connection with the KM180 establishes that no passengers continue to book London or the United States from Frankfurt and that all passengers on the KM180 have retrieved all their checks-
In the luggage of the destination
The Malta documents of KM180 did not record any unaccompanied luggage.
The defense counsel submits that there is no evidence that the baggage delivered to the gate has actually been loaded onto the flight and that there is no amount of baggage loaded.
However, the evidence provided by Mr. Kasteleiner indicated that it was evident from the documents that the door had not left luggage and it could be inferred that all the items sent there had been loaded.
Therefore, it can be clearly inferred from the documentary record that an unidentified and unaccompanied package travels from Luqa airport to Frankfurt on KM180 and is loaded on PA103A. 
The defense counsel submits that, for some reason, inferences cannot be drawn or are not safe.
First of all, it is considered that there is room for error, because computer time may deviate from real time, and because the time entered by the operator may be inaccurate, or because the clock or watch relied on is inaccurate, either because the entry is not made correctly.
It was further suggested that recording where the item came from is less important for the operator than making sure the item was flying to the right flight, and that the operator was interested in suggesting that they were already fully occupied, the accuracy of the records is not important to them.
It was also noted that although his name was on the list of official witnesses, the person who made the key record in production 1061 was not summoned to testify, and his absence was not explained at all.
We acknowledge that the possibility of error exists, but the computer clock is reset at the beginning of each day (
Although the exact time of reset is not stated)
People are interested in accurate time.
Because one of the purposes of keeping records is to be able to track baggage check-ins through the system.
These records are records kept on a regular basis for the purposes of airport operations and can be accepted without any reason to doubt their accuracy.
It was also suggested that the slight difference in the time record might mean that the inference sought by the Crown was wrong, especially because there might be an error in the cumulative effect.
Again, this is true, but the suspect\'s case was recorded as being coded in the middle of the KM180 luggage, thus reducing the possible meaning of such a mistake. 
Another point made by the defense is that the record itself shows errors, indicating that they cannot be relied.
The defense counsel referred to two specific issues.
The first entry relates to international line luggage arriving at V3 between 1221 and 1237 on December 21, 1988.
According to records, Lufthansa Airlines flight LH669 from Damascus has four cars of luggage.
In worksheet in production 1061 record this a semi-send of that the flight has been coding in Taiwan 202 between 1258 and 1307 a car was coding in Taiwan 207 to 1303 and 1309.
There is no other record of the flight\'s baggage code, so there is no record of a half truck on the surface of the record.
Given the time of submission, the LH669 luggage may be processed at the same time as the KM180 baggage, and the suspect\'s baggage may come from the Damascus flight.
However, witness Joachim Koscha referred to the notes in the record, which indicate that the luggage cart on that flight has been brought to customs as it happens from time to time and provide evidence that, vans shipped to customs may be reloaded in different ways, which may be the reason for the difference.
A number of other cases were also mentioned, where the record shows that there is a slight difference in the start and end times entered to code a particular shipment, and their faces seem to show, luggage from multiple flights may be coded at the same station at the same time.
Another item in production of 1060 was also mentioned.
In this case, the entry is as follows :-
When explained in the same way as the previously mentioned entries, this indicates that an item coded at a station in HM 1544 in December 21 was also sent to PA103A, referring to the passenger\'s record, the bear showed that the baggage from flight 1071 from Warsaw was being coded at the station.
The parties agreed that there was no transfer of passengers to PA103A on the flight, so the record appeared to show that there was another unaccompanied package on the flight.
In addition, it was suggested that records and other evidence indicate, or may indicate, that additional baggage items were carried on PA103A in addition to the production of the baggage listed in 1060.
The total number of items listed on production 1060 is 111, but the production of 199 pieces is a print of the PA103A passenger list, which shows that a total of 118 items have been checked in.
In addition, Mr. O\'Neill spoke about 21 online luggage arriving by plane from Berlin, so it was suggested that there were other items in addition to the items listed in the document.
There was no detailed review of production 199 in the evidence, nor did there be an inquiry into the differences in quantity.
However, it can be seen that the 21 items on the passenger list are marked with the letter TXL, and in the process of asking questions about one of the items, monika Diegmuller reads the letters for another question, indicate the item is from Tegel airport, Berlin.
Therefore, it seems likely that Mr. O\'Neill\'s 21 items will be included in the 118 items on the passenger list.
Based on some evidence, the remaining discrepancies may be interpreted as late baggage, which may not pass through the automated system. 
There are other comments on the operation of the system to the effect that there are indications that there may be informal work practices, such as one coder providing assistance to another coder, which may result in inaccurate records.
There is also evidence of how a single bag found in the wrong place is handled, which may have the same result.
In this regard, the evidence of FBI agent Lawrence Whitaker, who was present at the time of the V3 investigation and observed a person who described that he was wearing the right clothes for the area, brought a suitcase to the coding station and coded it in, but no record was seen.
Mr. Whitaker can\'t be absolutely sure there\'s no record.
In addition to pointing out possible errors in the record, defense counsel also drew attention to the fact that the record showed that a shipment of combined baggage from PA103A had been taken to x-
Check before installation.
If Crown theory is correct, this shipment should include suspicious items of km180.
It is believed that x-
Ray is likely to detect any explosive device in one case, especially when the Frankfurt staff are aware of the warning to be careful about the explosive device hidden in the radio cassette player.
After the autumn leaves operation on October 1988, such a warning was issued.